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Recent Cases

indicated that OGI would not have to
order any units and would still be in
compliance with the terms of the
letter.
TheApril 13 Letter Was
NotA Valid Requirements
Contract

In conclusion, the Court found
that although Konica's agent bound
Konica to the terms of the April 13
letter through her apparent authority,
nonetheless, the letter was not an
enforceable requirements contract
because it did not indicate how a

quantity term could be derived and
further the letter did not evidence an
exclusive requirements contract
which would render the quantity
term unnecessary.

Third Circuit Finds TWA Insolvent
by Andrew Geier
In In re Trans WorldAirlines,
Inc. Nos. 97-7037, 97-7082, 1998
WL 15848 (3rd Cir. Jan. 20, 1998),
the Third Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court's finding that Trans
World Airlines ("TWA") was
insolvent under the formula prescribed by 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A)
because the face value of its
liabilities exceeded the fair market
value of its assets. The Third Circuit
ruled that, because TWA was
insolvent on the date it deposited
$13.7 million with the clerk of the
district court, the deposit constituted
a transfer which was a voidable
preference under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)
and was therefore unreachable by
TWA's creditors.
TWA Filed for Chapter 11
Bankruptcy
In October, 1991, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York awarded
Travellers International A.G.
("Travellers") $12.3 million for
damages it incurred as a result of
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TWA's breach of contract. See
TravellersInt 'lA. G. v. Robinson,
982 F2d 96, 97 (3d Cir. 1992). The
following November, TWA deposited $13.7 million (which represented a recalculation of the
judgment amount plus an eleven
percent interest factor) with the
clerk of the district court to obtain a
stay of enforcement of the judgment.
See In re Trans WorldAirlines, 180
B.R. 389, 392 (Bankr. D.Del. 1994).
In January, 1992, TWA filed a
timely petition for reorganization
under Chapter 11. TWA then
attempted to prevent Travellers from
making a claim to the deposit to
satisfy its judgment by filing a
complaint against Travellers in
bankruptcy court. TWA sought a
declaration that the $13.7 million
deposit was a voidable preferential
transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)
and could not be reached by
Travellers in satisfaction of its
judgment. See Robinson, 982 F.2d at
97. This section, commonly known
as the "preference statute", provides
in relevant part that:
"[a] trustee may avoid any

transfer of an interest of the
debtor in property - (1) to
or for the benefit of a
creditor; (2) for or on account
of an antecedent debt owed
by the debtor before the
transfer was made; (3) made
while the debtor was insolvent; (4) made within 90 days
before the date of the filing
of the petition; (5) that
enables such creditor to
receive more than such
creditor would receive if (A) the case were a case
under Chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been
made; and (C) such creditor
received payment of such
debt to the extent provided by
the provisions of this title."
Travellers Makes a Claim to
TWA's Deposit
Travellers contended that TWA's
deposit did not fall within the
preference statute because not all
elements of the statute were satisfied. Specifically, Travellers argued
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that TWA had not met the third
element because it was solvent on
the date of the deposit. In determining TWA's solvency position,
Travellers applied the formula of §
101 (32)(A) which provides that a
corporation is insolvent when "the
sum of [its] debts is greater than all
of [its] property, at a fair valuation."
In determining a "fair valuation"
of TWA's operating assets, Travellers
used market-value figures as the
basis for its calculations. Travellers
argued that a fair valuation of these
assets required the use of market
values, assuming a sale of these
assets absent any time constraints.
Therefore, Travellers' valuation
reflected an assumption that TWA
would obtain the best available price
since it would have an indefinite
period of time in which to sell.
Travellers added the resulting value
to TWA's other assets and valued
TWA's total assets at over five
billion dollars.
Travellers again applied the "fair
valuation" language of § 101 (32)(A)
in calculating TWA's liabilities.
Interpreting the phrase "fair valuation" to apply to both assets and
liabilities, Travellers assigned TWA's
publicly traded debt its current
market value instead of its face
value. The value of TWA's publicly
traded debt was affected by the
threat of TWA's insolvency, so the
market value of the debt was much
lower than its face value. When
Travellers added the market value of
this debt to TWA's other liabilities, it
arrived at a figure of about three and
a half billion dollars. Since Travellers valuation reflected that TWA's
assets exceeded its liabilities,
Travellers contended that TWA was
solvent on the day of the deposit and

222 e Loyola Consumer Law Review

therefore the transfer was not void
under the preference statute.
Accordingly, Travellers asserted that
it had the right to reach TWA's
deposit in satisfaction of its judgment.
TWA, on the other hand, argued
that it was insolvent on the date of
the transfer. It contended that a "fair
valuation" of its operating assets
was achieved by a hypothetical sale
of the assets within a reasonable
time. TWA asserted that a "reasonable time" constituted anywhere
from 12 to 18 months. TWA
reasoned that this time frame
reflected a reasonable estimate of
the value of its assets based on what
could be realized from the assets by
converting them into cash. Applying
this method, TWA valued its assets
at about two and a half billion
dollars.
Contrary to Travellers' assertion,
TWA argued that the "fair valuation" language of § 101(32)(A) only
applied to assets, not liabilities.
Accordingly, it used the face value
of its publicly traded debt, which
was higher than its market value, as
the starting point for its liability
valuation. In addition to its other
liabilities, TWA also considered
"contingent liabilities" in its
calculations. These contingent
liabilities represented additional
costs that TWA would incur if it
ceased operations in the near future.
In total, TWA valued its liabilities at
between five and five and a half
billion dollars. Since TWA's calculations reflected that its liabilities
exceeded its assets, it argued that the
bankruptcy court should find that it
was insolvent, that its $13.7 million
deposit was a voidable preference,
and therefore that Travellers could

not reach the deposit in satisfaction
of its judgment.
Bankruptcy Court Finds TWA

Insolvent
In examining whether TWA's
transfer was a voidable preference,
the bankruptcy court relied primarily
on the insolvency element of the
preference statute to make its
determination. In doing so, it used
the insolvency formula of 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(32)(A). The bankruptcy court
agreed with TWA's assertion that the
"fair valuation" language of §
101(32)(A) permitted a valuation of
TWA's operating assets based on
their hypothetical sale within a
reasonable time. It further agreed
that 12 to 18 months was a "reasonable time." The court went on to
reject Travellers argument, that
TWA's operating assets should be
valued without consideration of a
time period for their sale, as
"unrealistic."
On the issue of TWA's liabilities,
the bankruptcy court again agreed
with TWA's calculations. It concluded that the "fair valuation"
language of § 101(32)(A) did not
apply to TWA's publicly traded debt
and therefore its liabilities should
include the face value, not the
market value, of the debt. The
bankruptcy court also accepted
TWA's other liability figures,
including contingent liabilities, on
the premise that it expected TWA to
go out of business in the near future.
The bankruptcy court determined
that TWA was insolvent under §
101 (32)(A) and therefore found that
TWA's deposit of $13.7 million was
void as a preferential transfer under
the preference statute. The bank-
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ruptcy court ruled that the deposit
could not be used by Travellers to
satisfy its judgment against TWA.
Travellers Appeals the Bankruptcy Court's Ruling
The United States District Court
for the District of Delaware heard
Travellers appeal of the bankruptcy
court's decision. The district court
agreed with TWA's valuation of its
operating assets, but disagreed with
TWA's valuation of its public debt. It
rejected TWA's argument that the
"fair valuation" language of §
101 (32)(A) did not apply to liabilities, holding that both assets and
liabilities were subject to the fair
valuation requirement. Consequently, the district court found that
the bankruptcy court erred in
allowing TWA to value its public
debt at face value when calculating
its liabilities. The district court
reversed that part of the bankruptcy
court's decision and remanded the
case with instructions to recalculate
TWA's liabilities.
Third Circuit Reviews Lower
Courts'Findings on the Basis
of a "Going Concern"
Both Travellers and TWA
appealed the district court's decision.
The Third Circuit, like the lower
courts, focused on the question of
TWA's solvency on the day of the
$13.7 million deposit with the clerk
of the district court. The court also
relied on the language of §
101(32)(A) in measuring TWA's
assets against its liabilities. In doing
so, the court determined that TWA
should be viewed in the context of a
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going concern because its "liquidation in bankruptcy was not clearly
imminent on the date of the challenged transfer." Since this conclusion affected the analysis of TWA's
solvency position, the court reexamined the valuation of TWA's
assets and liabilities in the context of
a "going concern."
The Court first analyzed TWA's
valuation of its assets. The court
opined that a time frame was
necessary for a fair valuation of a
company's assets stating that
"[l]ogic and common sense inform
us that the amount that can be
realized from the sale of an asset
varies as a function of the time
period over which the asset must be
sold." Having established that a fair
valuation of assets required a
reasonable time frame, the Third
Circuit turned to the question of
what constitutes a "reasonable time."
The Third Circuit rejected
Travellers' contention that a reasonable time was any amount of time
required for a company to sell its
assets at the highest possible price. It
stated that "the overwhelming body
of authority" supported TWA's
position "that a fair valuation of
assets contemplates a conversion of
assets into cash during a reasonable
period of time." It held that "reasonable time" should be defined in
relation to the financial interests of a
debtor company's creditors. Essentially, from the perspective of the
creditor, a "reasonable time" would
constitute a balance of the time it
would take to sell off the debtor's
assets so that the assets are not
undervalued and soon enough so
that the creditor achieves adequate
satisfaction of his claim when
considering the time value of money

and his business needs. The court
believed that this approach to
defining a reasonable time represented the creditors' "desire to
maximize the dollar figure from the
assets to be sold and the desire to
have the assets sold off quickly to
satisfy creditor's claims sooner
rather than later" The court accepted
TWA's 12 to 18 month definition of
"reasonable time" stating that it
"reflects the period in which a
diligent administrator, concerned
with the interests of TWA's creditors,
could inventory, prepare, and sell
TWA's considerable assets in a
reasonable fashion."
The Third Circuit next analyzed
the valuation of TWA's liabilities. In
doing so it considered three specific
issues: (1) the proper valuation of
TWA's public debts; (2) whether
TWA should be allowed to include
liquidation costs in its liabilities; and
(3) Travellers' argument that TWA's
liabilities should be reduced by one
billion dollars because of its
agreements with its creditors to
reduce its public debt prior to TWA's
deposit with the clerk of the district
court.
The court approached the first
question as a matter of statutory
interpretation. TWA maintained that
the phrase "fair valuation" in §
101 (32)(A) modified only the word
"property", not "debts." It argued,
therefore, that its debt should be
measured at face value. In support
this position, TWA pointed to an
earlier draft of § 101(32)(A) which,
it contended, made clear that "fair
valuation" was only meant to apply
to property. It argued further that §
101(32)(B), which governs insolvency of partnerships, clearly states
that the fair valuation requirement
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applies only to property, and that the
legislature did not mean for partnerships and corporations to be treated
differently. See 11 U.S.C. §
101(32)(B) (" 'insolvent' means...
that the sum of such partnership's
debts is greater than the aggregate
of, at fair valuation.., all of such
partnership's property...").
The Third Circuit ruled that
TWA's debts should be given their
face value in light of its finding that
TWA was a going concern. Because
the court viewed TWA as a going
concern, it found that TWA's debt
should not be assigned the lower
market value which resulted from
the threat of its insolvency. The
court reasoned that" 'fair valuation'
does not mean fair market valuation." Instead, it stated that a fair
measurement of TWA's public debt,
on a going concern basis, is the face
value of that debt.
Next, the court considered the
question of whether costs relating to
the cessation of TWA's operations
should be included in its "contingent
liabilities." Having already determined that TWA was a going
concern, the court disagreed with
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the bankruptcy court's decision to
allow TWA to include liabilities
associated with liquidation in its
contingent liabilities. The court
stated that contingent liabilities
should be limited to "costs arising
from foreseeable events that might
occur while the debtor remained a
going concern." A going concern
continues to conduct its ordinary
business activities, so, according to
the court, inclusion of liquidation
costs as a contingent liability would
be "the antithesis of a going concern
valuation." Therefore, it concluded
that the bankruptcy court erred in
permitting TWA to include these
costs in its liabilities.
Last, the court examined Travellers' argument that TWA had
reached an agreement with its
creditors to reduce its public debt by
one billion dollars. Travellers
claimed that TWA had reached such
an agreement before it deposited the
$13.7 million and consequently its
total liabilities should be reduced by
one billion dollars. The court,
however, quickly rejected this
argument and agreed with the
bankruptcy court's finding that no

such agreement existed on that date.
It stated that, although negotiations
had begun, no such agreement had
been finalized by the date of the
deposit. Accordingly, the court
accordingly held that the bankruptcy
court did not err on this issue.

Conclusion
Since the Third Circuit found that
all of the bankruptcy court's
calculations were correct, except
with regard to TWA's contingent
liabilities, it reduced the amount of
liabilities by the amount incorrectly
included by the bankruptcy court.
However, despite this reduction in
liabilities, TWA's total liabilities still
exceeded its total assets so the court
held that TWA was insolvent on the
date of the transfer. Accordingly, it
ruled that the $13.7 million deposit
was a void preferential transfer
under the preference statute and was
unavailable for satisfaction of
Travellers' claim against TWA.
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